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INTEGRATION OF THE BAR AND JUDICIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
By MAYNARD E. PIRSIG*
NTEGRATION of the bar has been accomplished by three methods
in the various states which have adopted it. The first method
used resorted to legislation which set forth in detail the struc-
ture and powers of the organization corresponding in content to
the typical constitution of existing voluntary bar associations.' Be-
ginning in 1934 in Kentucky,2 the second method pursued was to
enact a statute in short form directing or authorizing the highest
court of the state to integrate the bar, leaving to the court the task
of adopting rules providing for the details of organization. The
third course, followed in Nebraska, Oklahoma and Missouri, has
been by direct application by the bar to the highest court of the
state for the adoption of such rules. This proceeds on the basis
that the court in the exercise of its inherent power over the legal
profession of the state may provide for the effective organization
of the bar and no statute conferring power to act is needed.2
The last two methods of integration present the question what
precisely is the function and responsibility of the court when it
integrates the bar of its state either with or without an authorizing
statute. Integration in brief means that every practicing lawyer in
the state becomes a member of the organization that is created and
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. For an example see Cal. Stat., 1927, Ch. 34. This act followed the
pattern of the model act prepared by the American Judicature Soc. See Bar
Association Act, (1918) 2 Jr. Am. Jud. Soc. 111. Another model, followed in
some states, see Ala. Acts, 1923, No. 133, was offered by the Committee of
the Conference of Delegates of the American Bar Association on Bar Organ-
ization. See Bar Organization Act, (1920) 4 Jr. Am. Jud. Soc. 111.
2. Ky. Acts, 1934, Ch. 3.
3. In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, (1937) 133 Neb. 283,
275 N. W. 265; In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, (1939) 185
Okla. 505, 95 P. 2d 113.
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is required to pay to it a specified sum as annual dues. In return
he is entitled to the privileges of a member of the organization
and participation in its activities. The decisions settle beyond
question that the court, with or without statutory aid, may impose
these obligations.4 This is on the ground that the privileges granted
a lawyer on admission to the bar may be conditioned upon the
assumption of obligations deemed by the court to advance the
interest and welfare of the general public and the profession.
Until recently, whenever short form statutes directing integra-
tion have been enacted the courts have without exception taken
the necessary steps to organize the bar by the issuance of appro-
priate rules of court. Ordinarily, these rules have been prepared
by a committee representing the bar and have been adopted as sub-
mitted with little or no change. Even when there has been no
statute on the subject, courts have taken similar action, on peti-
tion of the bar, where the court has been satisfied that the general
sentiment of the bar is in favor of integration and have approved
the rules proposed.5
4. In're Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, supra, footnote 3; In
re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, supra, footnote 3; Ayres v. Hada-
way, (1942) 303 Mich. 589, 6 N. W. 2d 905; In re Mundy, (1942) 202 La.
41, 11 So. 2d 398; In re Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, (1943)
216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; Commonwealth v. Harrington, (1936) 266
Ky. 41, 98 S. W. 2d 53; Integration of Bar Case, (1943) 244 Wis. 8,
11 N. W. 2d 604, 12 N. W. 2d 699.
5. In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, supra, footnote 3;
In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, supra, footnote 3. In 1944, the
Supreme Court of Missouri issued rules for the integration of the bar on
petition of the bar but no opinion was rendered. For the rules see Rules of
Sup. Ct. of Mo., (1945) 352 Mo. i.
In several instances the courts have declined to grant the petition on the
ground that there had not been a satisfactory showing that a majority of the
members of the bar were in favor of integration. In re Unification of
Montana Bar Ass'n, (1939) 107 Mont. 559, 87 P. 2d 172; In re Integrated
Bar, (1947) ........ Mass ......... , 74 N. E. 2d 140. The opinion of the Montana
court is also hostile in its tone to integration. It again denied the bar's peti-
tion in Re Unification of Bar of This Court, (1947) ...... Mont ........ 175 P. 2d
773 in a cursory per curiam opinion stating some members of the court
thought legislation was necessary and others thought an integrated bar or-
ganization was not needed. See also Ells, Why Bar Integration was Re-
jected, (1944) 18 Conn. Bar Jr. 54, explaining why the Connecticut court
denied the petition to integrate, and the per curiam opinion of the New Jersey
court in denying a similar petition set forth in (1939) N. J. State Bar Ass'n
Year Book 155.
In Integration of Bar Case, (1943) 244 Wis. 8, 11 N. W. 2d 604, 12 N. W.
2d 699, and in Re Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, (1943) 216
Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515, decision on whether rules should be issued was
deferred until the return of lawyers in the armed services. Compare the
action of the Missouri court which accepted the 12 to 1 vote of these lawyers
while in service as a sufficient showing of their preferences. See Hemker,
Integrated Bar Created by Missouri Supreme Court, (1944) 28 Jr. Am. Jud.
Soc. 50. The later action of the Wisconsin court is the subject of this paper.
Further action by the Minnesota court has not taken place at this writing.
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The first important departure from this course of judicial
action with respect to integration of the bar is represented by
the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Re Integration of
the Bar,6 handed down in the closing days of 1946, in which the
application to integrate the bar of the state was denied. In 1943, a
typical short form statute had been enacted which provided :7
"(1) There shall be an association to be known as the 'State Bar
of Wisconsin' composed of persons licensed to practice law in
this state, and membership in such association shall be a condi-
tion precedent to the right to practice law in Wisconsin.
"The Supreme Court by appropriate orders shall provide for
the organization and government of the association and shall de-
fine the rights, obligations and conditions of membership therein,
to the end that such association shall promote the public interest
by maintaining high standards of conduct in the legal profession
and by aiding in the efficient administration of justice."
In the decision referred to, the Wisconsin court, as no other
court has done, refused, on application of the voluntary bar or-
ganization of the state, to comply with the statute and issue the
rules of integration which were contemplated. In view of its unique
position and the influence which the decision might have in other
states, it was thought desirable to examine with some care the
reasons which the court gave for its conclusions.
The court's objection to an integrated bar centered around the
requirement that all practicing lawyers must pay dues to the bar
organization which is created. "The fees," the court stated, "are
the life blood of the integrated bar and to integrate the bar with-
out fees would be useless." The court recognized that in the exer-
cise of its inherent power over the bar it could require these fees
to be paid and that they are not strictly license fees. However, it
continued:
"No matter what these fees be called, they are moneys re-
quired to be paid into the treasury of the bar for a public purpose
connected with the administration of justice. It appears to be
assumed in all the briefs that the court will fully exhaust its func-
tion by setting up the organization and requiring dues to be paid
and that from there on the court will leave the organized bar to
operate in a completely democratic and voluntary manner, dealing
with such problems as in the opinion of the bar are proper for
them to consider and to solve, and expending its moneys for these
democratically ascertained purposes."
"Nothing is further from the truth in our opinion. It appears to
us that the same considerations that may call for the court to
6. (1946) 249 Wis. 523, 25 N. W. 2d 500.
7. Wis. Stat., 1945, sec. 256.31.
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exercise power initially to integrate, require it to censor the budgets
and activities of the bar after integration. If the moneys do not
go into the State treasury and are not subject to audit or to the
legislative process of appropriation in which the public character
of the purposes for which the moneys are used may be considered,
this court must assume the responsibility of seeing that activities
of the bar for which these moneys are paid are sufficiently public
to warrant the use of the money for their promotion."
That there could be a self-governing integrated bar organiza-
tion under the authority and rules of the court was characterized as
"self contradictory."
"The bar as integrated would be definitely subordinate to the
-court and under the disagreeable necessity of having its activities
policed by the court and this being true, the price of integration
would be much greater than this court or any lawyer ought to be
willing to pay, unless the exigencies in respect to standards of
admission and discipline are so great as to warrant adoption of
some such expedient, either temporarily or upon a limited scale."
By way of illustration the court states some of the purposes
for which the funds could or could not be used. They could be
used in dealing with such problems as professional discipline, study
of bar admission standards and post-admission education. Blt
the emphasis is upon those activities which would be excluded:
The integrated bar "could not maintain a legislative agent. It
could not use its dues for any purpose advantageous to its mem-
bers that did not also further the good of the general public. We
doubt whether it could conduct propaganda in defense of the legal
profession. We feel quite sure that it could not seek legislative
definition of the boundary lines of the legal profession so as to
exclude accountants, labor agents and others from the trial of
cases before commissions which do not require parties to have
lawyers and that, we understand, is one of the purposes for which
the integrated bar would want to work. It could properly consider
judicial qualifications, tenure, salary or pensions, but carrying its
conclusion into effect could only be done with the greatest embar-
rassment to bar and bench. The funds ought not to be used in
judicial campaigns although members of the bar can properly act
in this field. It requires a very short look at some of the possible
activities of the bar to make it clear that this court would have
to insist upon scrutinizing every activity for which it is proposed
to expend funds derived from dues, and that a series of situations
would arise that would be embarrassing to the relations of bench
and bar. The bar ought to have the untrammeled power of acting
in unison to consider any matter close to the administration of
justice in which the members have special competency without
any feeling that its activities are subject to control or censorship.
A free and voluntary bar, even though embarrassed by lack of
[Vol. 32:1
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funds, is to be preferred to one that is or feels itself to be dominated
by the court unless some exigency tips the scales in favor of the
latter."
Of course, no one would want or has advocated a bar organiza-
tion subject to such limitations and restrictions. Integrated bar
organizations functioning under rules of court have been in opera-
tion over a period of years. There should be ample evidence in
this experience, therefore, to support the court's characterization
of such an organization if it rests upon a sound basis. If "con-
trol," "censorship," "policing," and "domination" by the court
are a product or necessary incident of an integrated bar created
by court rules, this fact should be disclosed in the available litera-
ture which comes from these organizations. It should appear in the
reports of the proceedings of annual meetings, in committee re-
ports, in the addresses of leaders of the bar and in the contents
of their bar journals. The opinion of the Wisconsin court does not
indicate that these were considered. The writer has examined this
literature, page by page, for each integrated bar association or-
ganized by rule of court. The results are briefly summarized in the
following pages." In no instance was there found any substantia-
tion for the court's description of the manner in which such an
organization must function. The one possible exception is in the
case of the integrated bar of Oklahoma.
KENTUCKY
Kentucky was the first state to adopt the short form statute
conferring authority on the highest court of the state to integrate
the bar." Court rules creating the organization were adopted within
a few weeks after the act was passed. These were prepared with
the assistance and advice of the committee on the subject of the
existing voluntary bar association. Requests for suggestions were
sent out to local bar associations but the speed with which the rules
were adopted did not permit complete examination of the subject
by these organizations. 10 There were no public hearings or contests
of the character held by the Wisconsin court. There is some indica-
8. The available materials in most instances did not go beyond 1946 and
sometimes not beyond 1945. Materials on the Wyoming State Bar and the
status under the West Virginia short form statute were not accessible to the
writer. See W. Va. Acts, 1945, Ch. 44.
9. Ky. Acts, 1934, Ch. 3. The validity of the act was sustained in Com-
monwealth v. Harrington, (1936) 266 Ky. 41, 98 S. W. 2d 53.
10. See Rees, Bar Integration by Legislative Act, (1934) Ky. State Bar
Ass'n Proc. 175.
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tion that the organization was set up before the lawyers of the
state were fully prepared for it."-
The rules, as thus drawn, contain some provisions which might
superficially suggest some interference by the court in the affairs
of the organization. Thus, Rule 2 provides that the Board of Com-
missioners "shall act as administrative agents of the Court of
Appeals for the purpose of enforcing such rules and regulations
as are prescribed, adopted and promulgated by the Court of Ap-
peals under the aforesaid Act." Likewise Rule 6 provides that the
Registrar shall be appointed by the court and his duties defined
by it. The Board, however, is elected by the members of the bar
and it, in turn, selects the officers including the treasurer to whom
the dues are paid. There is no provision for any report to the
court or for obtaining any approval from the court on any pro-
posed course of action. A study of the activities of the organization
indicates not the slightest interposition of the court in any matter.
Whatever rules or changes have been made in the rules originated
with the bar. Nowhere was there discovered any suggestion of in-
terference or comment or criticism from the court. At no time has
the court raised any question as to the use being made of the funds
of the organization, although their use has had all the range they
have in voluntary bar associations including the activities which
the Wisconsin court stated would have to be proscribed. The treas-
urer's reports are made to the association and not to the court.
Appropriations are made to the various committees without con-
sultation with the court, including the committee on unauthorized
practice of law.12
So far as content of subject matter dealt with, freedom of
choice as to questions to be considered, freedom of discussion and of
decision and recommendation are concerned, one could not dis-
tinguish the proceedings and activities of this organization from
that of a voluntary bar organization.
The relations between the bar organization and the judges of
the Court of Appeals have been most cordial, friendly and co-
operative. The judges regularly attend the meetings of the associa-
tion. At one time the court asked the aid of the bar in obtaining
relief from the excessive volume of litigation before the court,
stating it did not want to act without "the moral support and ap-
11. For a time there were from 700 to 800 lawyers in arrears in the
payment of dues. White, Aims and Purposes of the Kentucky State Bar
Ass'n, 1937 Ky. State Bar Ass'n Proc. 57. In 1942 there were but 7 delin-
quencies. President's Address, 1942 Ky. State Bar Ass'n Proc. 30, 33.
12. (1945) 9 Ky. State Bar Jr. 5, 7, 45.
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proval of this association." It asked that a committee on the sub-
ject be created."3 This hardly suggests an organization dominated or
controlled by the court. On the contrary a degree of mutual re-
spect and understanding is evidenced, equalled by few states with
voluntary bar organizations.
MICHIGAN
The Michigan bar was integrated by rule of court in 1935
While a short form statute had been enacted14 authorizing the court
to act and fixing the dues at $5.00 per year and, no doubt, stimulat-
ing the court into action, the court issued the rules in the exercise
of its own inherent power.',' As soon as the act was passed, the
court appointed a committee of lawyers to draft a proposed set of
rules of integration. The committee's draft on being presented was
promptly adopted.'0 There was no formal hearing and no question-
ing of the need for integration. No opinion was written. The follow-
ing comments were offered by Chief Justice Potter as the organiza-
tion started on its course :17
"The aim and object of Act No. 58, Pub. Acts 1935, to a large
extent was to give to the legal profession of this State the power to
govern itself. Under this act, rules have been framed and adopted
by the Supreme Court for the organization of the State Bar, and
additional rules have been framed by the State Bar for the govern-
ment of the profession. It is hoped these rules in their operation
will be for the benefit of the profession and of the public. If mis-
takes have been made in them, the profession may suggest amend-
ments thereto. At least a start has been made. If the organization
of the State Bar under the provisions of this act does not prove
of benefit and advantage to the bar and to the public, the scheme
should and will be discontinued. It is not claimed this legislation
and the action taken by the court in pursuance thereof is a cure-all.
It deals with the members of a great profession. Those members
are human, subject to all the frailties inherent in human nature.
No great reform was ever accomplished suddenly. But if the act
and the proceedings had thereunder shall in the long run make
for success, then it will have accomplished all that can be reasonably
expected. * * *
13. (1939) 3 Ky. State Bar Jr. No. 2, p. 19. A committee was appointed
which later made recommendations for meeting the problem. (1939) 4 Ky.
State Bar Jr. No. 1, p. 7.
14. Mich. Pub. and Local Acts, 1935, No. 58.
15. See Ayres v. -adaway, (1942) 303 Mich. 589, 6 N. W. 2d 905.
16. See Michigan Bar Organized Under Court Rules, (1936) 19 Jr.
Am. Jud. Soc. 146.
17. Potter, Foreword, (1936) 15 Mich. State Bar Jr. 4. Justice Bushnell
had earlier expressed his conviction in the need for an integrated bar. Bush-
nell, Law Enforcement and the Integrated Bar, (1935) 14 Mich. State Bar Jr.
215.
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"There is no reason why it cannot prove successful in Michi-
gan. It has had the approval of the legislative and executive de-
partments of government. The court has sought to cooperate with
the bar in making the organization a working force for good. It
remains for the members of the profession to give to the State Bar
their earnest and hearty cooperation. If this is done as it is con-
fidently expected will be done, the Integrated Bar cannot help
but be successful in counteracting unmerited criticisms, maintain-
ing higher ideals by the members of the profession resulting in
better service to clients and to the public, and in maintaining the
influence and importance of the lawyers of Michigan in society and
in government."
The rules vest the governing powers of the organization in a
Board of Commissioners elected by the members of the bar. Rule 11
explicitly leaves to the Board the making of "necessary appropria-
tions for disbursements from the funds in the treasury to pay all
necessary expenses of the State Bar." The books of account are
to be audited by a certified public accountant and a financial state-
ment presented at the annual meeting and filed with the clerk of
the Supreme Court.
Since the rules were adopted, the organization has pursued its
objectives with vigor, confidence and independence. The scope of
its activities is as wide as will be found in any voluntary bar associa-
tion. It has an active committee on unauthorized practice of law
which has participated in litigation before the Supreme Court on
the subject.ls It was instrumental in starting a campaign to reform
the method of selecting the judges of the Supreme Court. It has
a legislative committee which checks on pending legislation. Its
head office at Lansing serves lawyers in their private legal business
throughout the state in checking records, filing documents, etc., at
the capitol. Throughout the recorded proceedings there is no indi-
cation that the court has in any way attempted to direct, limit,
control, censor or supervise any activity of the association. Its
part has been confined exclusively to the adoption of the rules
governing the organization. After almost ten years of experience,
the president of the association could say :1-9
"The Court, with profound wisdom, and keenly sensible of
democratic processes, created an agency by means of which the
legal profession could effectively regulate and control itself, and
thus preserved inviolate the independence of the Bar as a branch
of the administration of justice."
18. See Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, (1939) 290 Mich. 56, 287
N. W. 377. The propriety of this appears to have been accepted without ques-
tion. Rule 8 expressly provides for this committee as a standing committee.
19. Burns, Let Us Magnify Our Calling, (1944) 23 Mich. State Bar
Jr. 553.
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That this represents the general judgment of the bar was re-
cently confirmed in realist fashion when, through its efforts, the
enabling act was amended to leave to the court, without legislative
restriction, the fixing of the amount of dues to be paid.20 There is
nothing in the experience of Michigan which lends support to the
views expressed by the Wisconsin court.
NEBRASKA
Prior to 1936, repeated attempts had been made in this state
to secure passage of a statute integrating the bar. In each instance,
serious opposition within the legal profession itself led to failure.21
In 1936, a committee of the voluntary bar association recommended
integration by application directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
Notwithstanding the objection raised at the annual meeting that
the Supreme Court, if once invited to act, might proceed to make
rules without consulting the bar or observing its recommendations,
the association approved the proposal and directed that the ques-
tion be submitted to a vote of the members of the bar including
the rules prepared by the committee. 22 The vote, taken by secret
ballot, resulted in approval with 595 lawyers in favor and 155
against.2 3 A petition was submitted to the court asking adoption
of the proposed rules and, after a hearing was held in which both
proponents and opponents were heard, a decision was reached,
supported by an opinion, in which the rules as proposed were
adopted practically without change.2 4 This is the first instance in
which a court has integrated the bar of a state without a prior
authorizing statute.
Under the rules adopted, the Executive Council, which consti-
tutes the governing body, and the officers are selected by the law-
yers, the former by ballot, the latter at the annual meetings. The
office of secretary-treasurer is held by the clerk of the supreme
20. Mich. Pub. Acts, 1947, No. 34. At the request of the Michigan State
Bar, the court immediately increased the dues to $10.00. See Rule 4, Mich.
Sup. Ct. Rules Concerning the State Bar of Mich., as Amended and Approved
Apr. 17, 1947.
21. Rept. of Comm. on Bar Integration, (1935) 26 Proc. Neb. State Bar
Ass'n 34.
22. Rept. of Comm. on Bar Integration, (1936) 27 Proc. Neb. State
Bar Ass'n 55.
23. At the time there were approximately 2100 lawyers in the state.
Campbell, The Association, Past and Present and Suggested Objectives,
(1937) 28 Proc. Neb. State Bar Ass'n 337.
24. In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, (1937) 133 Neb.
283, 275 N. W. 265. See Rept. of Sp. Comm. on Bar Integration, (1937) 28
Proc. Neb. State Bar Ass'n 322. The dues were fixed at $5.00 per year
instead of $3.00 as proposed.
1947]
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court. His reports are to the association and his accounts are audited
by a private firm of auditors. The funds collected as dues are thus
treated as association moneys, not as state funds. Frequent lauditory
comments upon his work as an officer of the association will be
found.25 The disposition of the moneys of the association appears
to be completely 'under the direction and control of the Executive
Council of the association.
Among the most vigorous and successful committees is that on
unauthorized practice of law. This committee, with others, was
created by the rules adopted by the court. It has proceeded aggres-
sively with its task as it affects real estate agents and brokers, trust
companies and banks, arbitration associations, title abstractors,
collection agencies, accountants, and others.2 6 It was instrumental in
procuring the prosecution by the state's attorney general of a
contempt proceedings against a layman practitioner appearing be-
fore the state railway commission. This litigation came before the
Supreme Court which ruled against some of the contentions of
the committee2- and in favor of others.2 8 There is no evidence
in any available material that the court in any way has questioned
the propriety of using the funds of the association for these pur-
poses.
Of considerable significance to the present discussion is the
fact that the association has a committee on public relations of
the bar. It has also a committee on legislation which at one time
sponsored legislation increasing the salaries of the judges of the
state including those of the supreme court and met with but limited
success. 2 There is nothing to indicate that the bar was handicapped
or the court embarrassed by the fact that this measure was spon-
sored by an organization created by the court. Neither was identi-
fied with the other.
There has been also a committee on selection of judges whose
proposals for change in the methods of selection have been the
subject of very substantial controversy within the organization
with little agreement reached to the present time.
In these and in other activities of the organization, the Supreme
Court has been completely out of the picture so far as recorded
proceedings reveal. Nor have the lawyers of the state been without
25. (1940) 31 Neb. State Bar Ass'n Proc. 53; (1941) 32 Neb. State
Bar Ass'n Proc. 8.
26. See (1940) 31 Neb. State Bar Ass'n Proc. 42.
27. State v. Childe, (1941) 139 Neb. 91, 295 N. W. 381.
28. State v. Childe, (1946) 147 Neb. 527, 23 N. W. 2d 720.
29. See (1941) 32 Neb. State Bar Ass'n Proc. 61.
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opportunity to express themselves on this very subject. In 1944,
a resolution was offered at the annual meeting requesting the court
to set aside the rules of integration and, if this was refused, pro-
posing a constitutional amendment to the same effect for submission
at the next election. The resolution recited that the rules "have re-
sulted in the regimentation of the lawyers of this State and have
tied their hands to carry out their duties to teach and inform the
people when their rights are being threatened with destruction,
and . . . it now appears that the abuses and inequities that have
grown up under such rules and regulations have become so op-
pressive to both the lawyers and the people as to be no longer
bearable." 30 The executive council recommended against adoption
of the resolution. While the recommendation was open for discus-
sion on the floor at the annual meeting, none was offered either
for or against it and on submission to a vote the recommendation
was adopted. Had there been any substantial sentiment in favor
of the resolution, it would undoubtedly have asserted itself at this
opportunity. The fact is the Nebraska State Bar Association is con-
ducted as free of restraint and domination and is as subject to the
control of its own members as is any voluntary bar organization.
The recorded proceedings of the association do not permit any other
conclusion. 31
VIGINIA
The State Bar of Virginia varies distinctly from those already
discussed in that the statute creates the bar organization as a dis-
tinct arm or agency of the state government. The 1938 act3 2
authorized the Supreme Court of Appeals to make rules (a) de-
fining the practice of law. (b) prescribing codes of professional
30. (1944) 35 Neb. Bar Ass'n Proc. 169.
31. In 1941 the president of the association made this comment: "It
is a safe assumption that few, if any, will deny that integration has brought
about a stimulation of the sense of professional obligation, a quickened recog-
nition of our opportunities for the improvement of judicial administration,
and a measurable success in the modernization of our legal processes and
their better adaptation to the needs of the people.
"With a more general understanding of our objectives and accomplish-
ments, and of the disinterestedness which has actuated them, has come an
elevation of the profession in public esteem, and in the regard and conSidera-
tion accorder to it by the public press.
"Today the Bar of this state deservedly occupies a higher position and
wields a greater influence for the good of the commonwealth than in the
days when the expressions by individual lawyers of our purposes, although
they were representative of our major attitudes, lacked the coherence and
authority of well-considered, collective action." (1941) 32 Proc. Neb. State
Bar Ass'n 7.
32. Vir. Acts, 1938, Ch. 410.
19471
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and judicial ethics. (c) prescribing the procedure for disciplinary
action and (d) organizing and governing an association composed
of the lawyers of the state "to act as an administrative agency of
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for the purpose of
investigating and reporting the violation of such rules and regula-
tions" to a court for the necessary proceedings. The court was also
authorized to fix a schedule of fees to be paid by the members "for
the purpose of administering this act."
A "Committee of Forty," thirty-six of whom were selected by
the bar and six by the court, drafted the rules for the court. They
were adopted without a formal hearing and without rendition of an
opinion.33 They provide for a Council, similarly selected, to gov-
ern the organization. Committees on professional ethics, on judi-
cial ethics and on unauthorized practice of law were created. Local
committees were provided for to render opinions on these subjects
and to deal with complaints of violation of the standards fixed.
What was thus created was essentially a self-policing organiza-
tion having the attributes of a department of state with the cost
and responsibility of administration borne by the legal profession.
The voluntary state bar association which secured the enactment
of the statute has continued in existence and remains active in the
field of professional and social activities other than those specifi-
cally conferred by the statute upon the new organization. This dual
organization has undoubtedly dissipated the effective strength of
the bar of the state and there has been some agitation, ineffective to
date, to merge the two organizations2 4 The integrated organization,
the Virginia State Bar, has to some extent extended its activities
into fields other than those enumerated by the statutes and this is
permitted and contemplated by the court rules,35 but these efforts
appear to have met with but limited success.
33. See Rules for Integration of the Virginia State Bar, Rule IV,
(1938) 171 Vir. xvii.
34. Commenting on the small attendance at the annual meetings of the
Virginia State Bar, its president said, "It is obvious that few men have
sufficient leisure hours to contribute to the advancement of their profession
through two separate organizations. It is a duplication of money and an
invitation to rivalry which should not exist." Rept. of Guy B. Havelgrove,
pres., .(1942) 4th Annual Rept. of Vir. State Bar 21. See also President's
Annual Report, (1946) 8th Annual Rept. of Vir. State Bar 9, 11.
35. Rules for Integration of the Vir. State Bar, (1938) Rule IV, see.
9 (k) provides that the Council may exercise power:
"To cultivate and advance the science of jurisprudence;
"To promote reform in the law and in judicial procedure;
"To facilitate the administration of justice;
"To uphold and elevate the standards of honor, of integrity and of
courtesy in the legal profession;
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The experience in Virginia is thus unique and of limited signifi-
cance to this discussion since the principle of integration has been
applied to a limited degree only. Several points, however, are worth
noting. The court respected the statute and issued the rules con-
templated by it. Second, the organization set up has been self-
governing. There is no evidence that the court has taken any part
in its affairs. This is all the more significant when one considers
the degree to which the organization is treated as an arm of the
state and as an "administrative agency of the Supreme Court of
Appeals." Moneys received from dues are treated as state funds36
and the reports of the organization as state documents. This ap-
proach was probably intended to strengthen the hand of the bar
in dealing with problems of discipline and unauthorized practice
of law.3 7 These are fields traditionally associated with judicial
control of the legal profession. Under these circumstances one might
expect the court to take an active hand in the affairs of the organi-
zation. This has not been the case. The committee on unauthorized
practice of law has carried on an aggressive campaign against real
estate dealers,35 collection agencies and others. Suits have been
commenced to prohibit persons not admitted to the bar from prac-
ticing law and counsel have been employed to assist in their prose-
"To encourage higher and better education for membership in the profes-
sion;
"To promote a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood among the members
of the Virginia State Bar...."
Special committees on such subjects as Revision of Procedure, Local Bar
Association, Legislation, Legal Education and Admission to the Bar have been
appointed. The committee first named has been particularly active in attempts.
to secure rule making power for the Supreme Court.
36. For a time funds unused at the expiration of the fiscal period re-
verted to the General Fund of the state. This was corrected by Vir. Acts 1940.
Ch. 314; creating a State Bar Fund. The treasurer's reports have been audited
by the state auditor.
In 1941 the Attorney General ruled that these funds were properly under
the supervision of the Supreme Court rather than the executive department
as had theretofore been the case. Rept. of Pres. John S. Battle, (1941) 3d
Annual Rept. of Vir. State Bar 13, 14.
37. "There may be claimed for the Bar, however, a peculiar advantage
over the parent association, an advantage appreciated by its founders, which
in a proper case is fundamental to its usefulness. This advantage grows out
of the official character of the Bar and its potentialities for expressing the
wishes of all of the lawyers of Virginia. Such an advantage is an indis-
pensable prerequisite to the proper functioning of the District Committees in
the matter of discipline. It is equally indisinensable in the valuable work
of the Unauthorized Practice Committee, which, in its dealings with others
of conflicting interest, must necessarily feel that the entire Bar is behind it."
Rept. of Pres. Samuel H. Williams, (1940) 2d Annual Rept. of Vir. State
Bar 8, 11.
38. See Rept. of Comm. on Unauthorized Practice. of Law, (1946) 8th
Annual Rept. of Vir. State Bar 30.
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cution and paid from state bar funds.-" In these and other activities
no check or control by the court has been discovered.
TEXAS
In 1939, through the efforts of the voluntary state bar associa-
tion, Texas enacted a short integration statute.40 The act created
the State Bar as "an administrative agency of the Judicial De-
partment of the State" and directed the Supreme Court "to prepare
and propose rules and regulations" on disciplinary proceedings,
"for the conduct of the State Bar," and prescribing a code of pro-
fessional ethics. Dues were limited to $4.00 per year, payable to
the clerk of the court "to be held by him and expended by the
Court or under its discretion for the purpose of the administration
of this Act." Submission of the rules before adoption to a vote of
not less than 51% of the members of the bar, with majority ap-
proval of each rule adopted, was required.
The court fixed the dues at $4.0041 and arranged for the selec-
tion of a committee of nineteen elected at local meetings of the
bar to draft the rules. After wide circulation, discussion and fre-
quent revision of the rules drafted by this committee, the rules
finally submitted received a favorable vote of 64% of the bar of
the state with all rules individually voted upon receiving a favor-
able majority. 42 Following this they were adopted by the court. 43
These rules place the power and responsibility for the function-
ing of the organization in the hands of a Board of Directors elected,
along with the President and Vice-President, by the members of
the bar. While the dues of members are paid to the clerk of the
court, under the rules these are turned over by him, after deducting
his expenses in connection therewith, to the treasurer of the asso-
ciation elected by the Board. The Board is authorized to "direct
39. Rept. of Pres. John S. Battle, (1941) 3d Annual Rept. of Vir.
State Bar 13, 15.
40. 46 Tex. Gen. Laws, 1939, Title: Attorneys, p. 64.
41. (1939) 2 Tex. Bar. Jr. 158.
42. (1940) 3 Tex. Bar Jr. 187. During consideration of the proposed
rules, a justice of the court assured the bar, "It is not the purpose of the rules
to cramp or hedge the rights of lawyers. They will be fair and just because
the lawyers are recommending them." (1939) 2 Tex. Bar Jr. 382.
43. Mr. Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court, in address-
ing the first annual meeting of the nev organization, said: "You have brought
about the self-organization of the whole Bar through rules drafted by a com-
mittee headed by your President and composed of lawyers elected at meet-
mngs held in each of your judicial districts. All these steps were under the
supervision of your court. Your State Bar organization now is truly demo-
cratic and representative. It includes all the lawyers and not merely those
who choose to join." (1940) 59 Proc. State Bar of Tex. 81.
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the manner and purposes for which all funds of the State Bar shall
be disbursed." How these funds are to be used appears to have
been left by the court entirely to the State Bar and nothing has
been found to indicate that the court has taken any part in deter-
mining how or for what purposes these funds should be disbursed.
The organization since its creation has been operating com-
pletely under its own direction. The scope of its activities is as
wide as that of the typical voluntary bar association. The creation
of committees, their appointment, activities and reports, the presen-
tation of their work and recommendations at the annual meetings,
the work of the Board and officers and the discussions at the meet-
ings contain nothing to suggest that the court is in any manner
supervising or limiting or even observing the work of the organi-
zation.
An important part of the organization's work has been directed
toward the unauthorized practice of law. The rules of court ex-
pressly authorize the grievance committees to deal with this prob-
lem, to bring proceedings "to suppress, prohibit or prevent it, and
to employ help therefor, "such persons to receive compensation
as fixed by the Board. ' 44 Hexter Title & Abstract Co., Inc. v.
Grievance Conzmsittee45 involved this problem and was success-
fully prosecuted before the Supreme Court by the State Bar. No
difficulty is indicated by the case from the fact that an organ of
its own creation was appearing before the court. It suggests that
both considered themselves independent of each other.
Since 1942, a public relations committee has been functioning,
engaged primarily in promoting better public understanding of and
feeling toward the bench and bar. The court has not shown a dis-
position to regard this, as did the Wisconsin court, as involving the
improper use of moneys received from dues to benefit the bar only
and hence not for a public purpose.
That the relationship between the integrated bar and the court
has been excellent and unhampered is reflected throughout the
materials found in the Texas Bar Journal and in the reported pro-
ceedings of the organization. In 1941, the president of the State
Bar remarked :46
"Let me say to you that the lawyers of Texas should be proud
of the fact that they have had a court during the last two years
that was willing to work with the lawyers, and that is still willing
44. Rules Governing the State Bar of Texas, 1940, Art. XII, sec, 35.
45. (1944) 142 Tex. 506, 179 S. W. 2d 946.
46. (1941) 60 Proc. State Bar of Tex. 98. See also (1942) 61 Proc.
State Bar of Tex. 5.
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to work with the lawyers, and that will do anything in the world to
advance the profession or do anything for the good of the judiciary.
I think we ought to be proud of the fact that we at this time
have a court that is willing to go straight down the line for the im-
provement of our business and the business of the public."
This feeling is substantiated by the fact that in 1941, the bar
successfully urged the enactment of a statute conferring on the
court full rule making power in the field of civil procedure and that
these rules were prepared and promulgated by the court with the
active participation of the bar.
4 7
The experience in Texas does not bear out the critical estimate
of the integrated bar by the Wisconsin court.
OKLAHOMA
Integration in Oklahoma has had a turbulent history. In 1929,
a statute was enacted containing detailed provision for the organiza-
tion of the bar and not necessitating court action.48 The act pro-
vided for a Board of Governors elected by members of the bar
and vested with the executive powers of the organization. In-
cluded was the fixing of the qualifications and examination of ap-
plicants for admission to the bar and the formulation and enforce-
ment of rules of professional conduct, both subject to the approval
of the Supreme Court. The funds from dues were to be paid to the
State Treasurer but disbursed at the direction of the Board.
The organization created was thus largely self-governing. The
bar of Oklahoma functioned under it for a period of ten years and
evidently gave satisfaction to the great majority of the lawyers
of the §tate.40 However, the efforts of a persistent minority led to
repeal of the act effective July 28, 1939,50 and the bar suddenly
found itself presented with the loss of the organization through
which it had acted, together with the $20,000 accumulated in the
state treasury, and no means with which to carry on its organized
activities.
The Nebraska decision5 suggested the solution, integration by
rule of court. The Board of Governors immediately created a
committee authorized to petition the court for rules of integration
47. See Stayton, Salute to the New Rules, (1941) 4 Tex. Bar Jr. 273.
48. Okla. Stat., 1929, Ch. 264. The act was patterned on the California
statute. See footnote 1.
49. In 1933, in resisting efforts to repeal the act, 90% of the lawyers of
the state signed petitions opposing repeal. (1933) 19 A. B. A. Jr. 488.
50. Okla. Stat., 1931, Ch. 22.
51. In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, (1937) 133 Neb. 283,
275 N. W. 265.
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and to prepare suggested rules for adoption. 2 The rules submitted
by this committee followed the characteristic pattern of integration
rules including an elected governing board. One important change
from the repealed statute left control over admission to the bar and
professional discipline in the hands of the court.5 3
On June 29th, 1939, the petition of the committee for integra-
tion not having been acted upon, the court issued a temporary order
creating an Executive Council, appointed by the court itself, to be
the successors of the Board of Governors and to perform such
other duties as the court might direct.14 A referee was appointed to
take over the assets and funds of the expiring organization.
On October 10th, 1939, the court rendered its decision on the
petition. 5 Instead of adhering to the plan of organization of the
rules proposed to it, the court followed the plan of organization
initiated by the temporary order. The rules adopted by the court
created an Executive Council appointed by the court itself which in
turn selected its own officers. They also provided for a Board of Bar
Examiners appointed by the court. The rules are concerned pri-
marily with disciplinary and admission procedures and powers.
Only incidentally do they deal with the powers, activities and organ-
izational details of the bar association itself. They permit payment
of the expenses of the annual meetings and publication of the Bar
Journal. Dues were reduced from those previously existing.50 The
members named by the court to the new Council were those which
it had appointed to the temporary Council. So far as could be dis-
covered, none had held previous office or been a member of the
Board of Governors of the repealed statutory organization.
These rules represented a radical departure from one of the
basic tenets of an integrated bar, that it should be a self-governing
body with powers and direction in the hands of a board and officers
52. (1939) 10 Okla. State Bar Jr. 235.
53. (1939) 10 Okla. State Bar Jr. 236.
54. (1939) 10 Okla. State Bar Jr. 303.
55. In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, (1939) 185 Okla. 505,
95 P. 2d 113. The opinion of the court sets out the rules adopted.
56. They were reduced from $5.00 to $3.00 for active- members, from
$3.00 to $1.00 for inactive. These proved inadequate and the inherited $20,000
surplus soon was depleted. See Moore, Highlights on the Tulsa Convention,
(1941) 12 Okla. State Bar Jr. 426. Through the persistence of the association,
the court raised the dues later to the old rates, see (1941) 12 Okla. State Bar
Jr. 433, and these proving insufficient, see (1941) 12 Okla. State Bar Jr.
1701; (1942) 13 Okla. State Bar Jr. 1572, 1602, they were raised to the
present rates of $7.50 and $4.00 respectively for active. and inactive mem-
bers. (1943) 14 Okla. State Bar Jr., Part II, p. 336. Publication of the
opinions of the Supreme Court in full in the Bar Journal consumes a
large part of the funds of the organization.
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selected by the lawyers. Instead, they provided for an organization
in which the lawyers were governed by a board appointed by the
court. It is in striking contrast to the action of every other court
which has undertaken the integration of the bar.
What accounted for this usual action the writer cannot judge.
He suspects it stemmed, to some extent, from resentment over the
court's having been deprived under the repealed act of the primary
responsibility and control over admission, discipline and standards
of professional conduct, functions which the court theretofore had
traditionally exercised. It was probably the result also of the pre-
cipitous action necessitated by the sudden repeal of the bar act
which prevented discussion and criticism of the rules by members
of the bar before they were adopted. Neither the court's opinion
nor other available materials suggest that the court was actuated
by reasons or considerations of the character stated by the Wis-
consin court.
The lawyers of the state immediately took steps to off-set the
consequences of these ill conceived rules. At their first annual
meeting, they adopted by-laws creating an elected House of Dele-
gates which should control and administer the affairs of the associa-
tion "excepting only those powers and functions which are vested
in the Executive Council and in the Board of Bar Examiners by the
Rules of the Supreme Court."57
Two governing bodies thus existed and, while their powers and
duties technically were not conflicting, friction was bound to and
did occur. A committee created by the House of Delegates on re-
vision of the rules58 stated one of its purposes as:
"Consolidating said Association into a single, homogeneous
body with the controlling authority vested in the House of Dele-
gates in lieu of an organization with divided authority, most of the
controlling powers being vested in the Executive Council whose
members take no part in the Association activities and, under the
existing rules, are specifically prohibited from holding any office
therein; such divided authority necessarily resulting in more or
less conflicts and friction."
It proposed amendment of the rules so as to provide for election of
the Executive Council by the House of Delegates instead of by the
Supreme Court and fusion of the Executive Committee with the
57. (1940) 10 Okla. State Bar Jr. 847. The president and vice-president
were to be elected at the annual meetings. An executive committee also was
created to conduct the affairs of the association between meetings of the
House of Delegates. The model followed was that of the American Bar
Association.
58. (1941) 12 Okla. State Bar Jr. 945.
59. (1941) 12 Okla. State Bar Jr. 1703.
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Council. 8 The proposal was approved by the House of Delegates. 1
The court, however, was "opposed to relinquishing their rights to
appoint the nine members of the Executive Council," but after fur-
ther negotiations the court agreed that "it would be willing to in-
crease the membership of the Executive Council from nine to fif-
teen, the additional six members to consist of the President and
Vice-President of the Oklahoma Bar Association, one member of the
Board of Bar Examiners, and a member from each of the three
Criminal Courts of Appeal judicial districts, to be elected by the
House of Delegates." The bar committee agreed to this compromise
"believing that this will be a material step in the direction of co-
ordinating and harmonizing the two more or less non-cooperative
branches of our Association."' 2 Rules carrying out this compromise
were adopted by the court 3 and these have continued to the present
time.
The writer has been informed by responsible sources that the
present arrangement is working out satisfactorily and that the
court has appointed members to the Council not objectionable to the
bar. But the fact that a inodus operandi has been established cannot
conceal the fact that the bar of Oklahoma has been deprived by an
exceptional obstinacy on the part of its Supreme Court of the right
to a free and self-governing organization.
This experience, however, hardly confirms the views concerning
the integrated bar which have been expressed by the Wisconsin
court. Dispite their difficulties, there is no agitation evident among
the lawyers of the state for abandonment of the integrated form of
bar organization. The experience suggests rather that when the bar
of a state requests its court to adopt rules of integration, it should
ascertain with some assurance that the court understands what
integration means and what its responsibilities to the bar are, and
that before rules are adopted there be opportunity for free dis-
cussion and criticism by the lawyers of the state.
LOUISIANA
Integration was introduced to the lawyers of Louisiana under
the worst possible circumstances. The Huey Long regime seized
60. (1941) 12 Okla. State Bar Jr. 1699.
61. (1941) 12 Okla. State Bar Jr. 1705.
o2. (1942) 13 Okla. State Bar Jr., Part II, p. 163.
63. (1942) 13 Okla. State Bar Jr., Part II, p. 258. Significantly, the
reorganized Executive Council, at its first meeting, selected for its chair-
man the president of the association although the court had not adopted the
rccommendation of the House of Delegates that the president automatically
be such chairman. See (1942) 13 Okla. State Bar Jr., Part II, p. 165.
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upon the concept of an integrated bar and enacted a statute creating
an all-inclusive organization of lawyers, the governing body of
which was to be elected by the voters of the state at the polls. 64 This
obviously permitted control of the organized bar by the dominant
political party. It was immediately and vigorously resisted by the
voluntary bar organization of the state.65 The latter continued in
existence and undertook to extend its membership notwithstanding
the membership in two organizations that this required. The oppo-
sition was not to the principle of integration but to the method and
control that had been incorporated. One of the clearest expressions
of principle was made by the president of the voluntary association
in 1937:66
"Our committee believed, and I understand this Association to
believe, 'that placing an association of lawyers in any wise under
the government of officials not elected by the lawyers themselves
in a free and untrammeled election is an effort to regiment the
profession, to lessen its independence and to deprive it not only of
rights which it has enjoyed from time immemorial, but which are
enjoyed by all other professions and even by the trades."
The opposition of the bar took the form of advocating as an
alternative to the objectionable act a short form statute authorizing
the Supreme Court to issue rules of integration. Such a statute was
enacted in 1940 which created an integrated bar association "which
Association shall be self governing," and the earlier act was re-
pealed."'
The court immediately arranged for the election by the lawyers
of the state of a committee to prepare the rules desired and submit
them to the court, following in this respect the Texas example.
Rules were drafted by the committee and these were adopted by
the court without change, 68 opportunity for criticism and sugges-
tions for amendment being given at the first meeting of the new
organization. No opinion of the court was rendered at any stage.
The rules so adopted have remained to the present time. They
provide the typical form of integrated bar organization with a Board
of Governors and officers elected by the bar and given complete
64. La. Acts, Ex. Sess., 1934, Act 10.
65. See 34 Rept. La. State Bar Ass'n, (1935-1941) pp. 16, 47, 52, 83,
141, 177, 217, 244.
66. 34 Rept. La. State Bar Ass'n, (1935-1941) p. 89.
67. La. Acts, 1940, Acts 54, 55.
68. The acts, orders, rules and by-laws are set forth in (1941) 1
Rept. La. State Bar Ass'n 91, et seq. The voluntary association was
d'ssolved and the books and assets transferred to the new organization (1935-
1941) 34 Rept. La. State Bar Ass'n 250.
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control over the administration and affairs of the association in-
cluding the collection of dues and disbursement of its funds. The
activities engaged in have been the usual ones. A committee on bar
admission is appointed by the court on recommendation of the
Board of Governors and through this committee the bar has played
an important role in dealing with problems of admission.
So far as can be discovered the court has taken no part or con-
cern in the internal affairs of the organization, although there has
not always been agreement between its officers and the court on
matters of admission to the bar.
After a bitter experience in resisting an attempt to gain political
control over it, the Louisiana bar has thus gained, through its own
efforts and choice, a self-governing all-inclusive organization,
operating under rules of court. This bit of history emphasizes
again the lack of substance in the arguments of the Wisconsin court.
MISSOURI
Integration of the bar came to Missouri in stages. Until 1934,
there was the typical history of repeated failure to secure favorable
legislation which the voluntary bar association of the state spon-
sored. Following the decision of It re Richards" in which the
court upheld its inherent power to control the professional con-
duct of members of the bar, the state bar association requested the
court, in the exercise of its power, to appoint a commission "to
investigate the means of regulating professional matters and .. .
report to the court . . .its findings and recommendations with re-
spect to the regulation of the practice of law."17 0 The request was
granted and a commission appointed which in its report 7 ' recom-
mended the adoption of specific rules covering admission to the
bar, the canons of ethics, disciplinary proceedings, unauthorized
practice of law, and creation of a judicial council. Local bar com-
mittees and a general chairman acting on a state wide basis were
to be appointed by the court to administer this program. The
proposed rules also provided for the imposition of a fee by the court
upon all members of the bar payable through local court clerks to
the clerk of the Supreme Court and to be disbursed at the request
of the local bar committees for the above purposes.
69. (1933) 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. 2d 672.
70. (1933) 5 Mo. Bar Jr. 67.
71. (1933) 5 Mo. Bar Jr. 67.
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The court adopted these rules almost without change72 and they
have continued with minor amendments to the present time.
It was not long before agitation within the bar was renewed for
an integrated organization of the bar. In response to petitions from
various bar associations, the court appointed a committee to study
the question and report its recommendations to the court. The com-
mittee drafted a proposed plan of integration and held a hearing
upon it. After further discussion and several revisions a final
draft was submitted to the vote of the bar. The vote was 6 to 1 in
favor of the plan, about 40% of the bar voting. 3
The court thereupon adopted the rules recommended without
further hearing and without rendering an opinion.T
4
These rules leave the local bar committees, existing under the
previous rules as already discussed, unaffected. The method of
collecting fees for these committees is utilized to collect the dues
for the new organization. A Board of Governors elected by the
bar is given control of the bar organization. "Its determination of
questions of method and of policy relating to the accomplishment
of the purposes of the Missouri Bar shall be controlling." Means
are provided for a referendum of the bar in case substantial num-
bers of lawyers are in disagreement with the Board, "and a ma-
jority vote of the membership voting in said referendum shall be
controlling.' '75 Expenses are paid from the bar fund created by the
dues collected "as authorized and directed by the Board of
Governors." 7
In the short time the new organization has been functioning,
its activities have covered the range of those of the voluntary
association which discontinued its existence. Some of these fall
within the sphere which would be considered improper by the
Wisconsin court. There is an unauthorized practice of law com-
mittee although its work need not be extensive since this problem
is also within the jurisdiction of the local bar committees." The
72. Rules for the Government of the Supreme Court of Missouri, (1934)
Rules 35-9, 335 Mo.; Subsequent modifications need not be noted for this
discussion.
73. See Hemker, Integrated Bar Created by Missouri Supreme Court,
(1944) 28 Jr. Am. Jud. Soc. 50; President's Message, (1945) 1 Jr. of Mo.
Bar 3.
74. Rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri, (1945) 352 Mo. xxxi.
75. Rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri, (1945) Rule 7.06. 352
Mo. xxxiii.
76. Rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri, (1945) Rule 7.13, 352
Mo. Xxxv.
77. See Rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri, (1945) Rule 5.18, 352
Mo. xxviii.
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organization has conducted a vigorous legislative campaign, meet-
ing with limited success, to secure salary increases for the judges
of the state including those of the Supreme Court.7 1 It has studied
and recommended a plan of group insurance for members of the
bar.70 In none of these or in the other numerous activities is there
any evidence of interference or limitation by the Supreme Court,
but, on the contrary, esteem and respect for the court and its mem-
bers is evidenced throughout the available materials. There has
been free discussion and full publication including even criticism
of the court's own regulations in the sphere of its appellate work.80
The Missouri Bar is further proof that an integrated bar association
can be self-governing in every sense of the word.
These brief descriptions do not, of course, cover the full range
of the activities of the various bar organizations discussed. They
have been confined to those features considered significant to the
question whether judicial control or supervision was in any degree
exercised. No item of such interference which was discovered has
been omitted. At best, these accounts cannot reveal the full measure
of independent functioning of these organizations. As one goes
through the recorded proceedings of their annual meetings, the
committee reports, the addresses of officers and the journals pub-
lished by the organizations, the complete freedom of discussion and
action and the absence of any visible hand or influence on the part
of the court is impressive. Only in Oklahoma was there anything
to suggest the contrary and, even there, the bar did not hesitate to
assert itself and arrive at what appears to be a workable under-
standing with the court. The charge by the Wisconsin court that
an integrated bar organization cannot be self-governing and in-
volves restrictions harmful to the bar and embarrassing to the court
is negatived by the established facts.
There remains the question whether its arguments are not in
principle inherently sound and have been overlooked or disregarded
by the other courts. The position of the court is reducible to three
contentions:
1. The moneys collected as dues from members of the bar must
be used for a public purpose.
78. See President's Message, (1945) 1 Jr. of Mo. Bar 49; (1945) 1 Jr.
of Mo. Bar 77 (Board of Governors adopted resolution favoring increase) ;
President's Message, (1945) 1 Jr. of Mo. Bar 95; (1945) 1 Jr. of Mo. Bar
137 (resolution adopted at annual meeting supporting increase).
79. (1945) 1 Jr. of Mo. Bar 77 (approved by Board of Governors).
80. See discussion criticizing court's limitation on oral argument. (1946)
2 Jr. of Mo. Bar 142.
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2. Some activities of such an organization do, or may, not serve
a public purpose but serve the interests of the members of the
organization only.
3. The court, therefore, is under a duty to police, censor and
control the activities of the organization to assure that the funds
are spent for the permissible purposes only.
That a public purpose must be served in using funds collected
from dues is unquestionably sound. The difficulty with the court's
position lies in its unwillingness to find such purpose being served
by an integrated bar association. tvidently, it is more willing to
find a public purpose in an American Legion convention"" than in
the work of an all inclusive organization of Wisconsin lawyers.
The original creation and subsequent development of bar associa-
tions sprung from the conviction that the legal profession was
under an obligation to the public to render its public service at its
highest level and that this duty could not be effectively met without
an adequately organized bar. 2 Integration of the bar means merely
that every lawyer is under a duty, and therefore should be re-
quired, to support these organized efforts.83
The functions which a bar association, integrated or voluntary,
serves may be summarized as follows:
1. It enables the bar as a unit to formulate and promote meas-
ures for improvement in the substantive and procedural law, in
the administration of the courts and in the securing of a more highly
qualified bench and bar. The value to the public of this contribution
is self-evident.
81. State ex rel. American Legion 1941 Convention Corporation of
Milwaukee v. Smith, (1940) 235 Wis. 443, 293 N. W. 161. Involved was
the validity of a statute appropriating $50,000 to relator to assist in holding
and operating the American Legion national convention in Milwaukee, Wis-
consin. The court found the objectives of the Legion to be patriotic in char-
acter and "are in the elevation of the spirit and ideals which make for good
citizenship, and the welfare of all citizens, as well as its own members, if
furthered thereby." The case is not wholly analogous to the one under dis-
cussion since there had been an express legislative declaration of public pur-
pose and the expenditures would be audited by the state auditor. The state-
ment of the text holds nevertheless.
82. Wickser, Bar Associations, (1930) 15 Corn. L. Quart. 390.
83. Court rules of integration commonly state in general terms the
objectives to be achieved. Typical are those in Michigan: "The Association
shall, under these rules aid in the promotion of improvements in the adminis-
tration of justice and the advancement of the science of jurisprudence, in the
improvement of the relations between the profession and the public, and in
the promotion of the interests of the legal profession in this State." Supreme
Court Rules Concerning the State Bar of Michigan, (1935) sec. 1, 273
Mich. x~xv. The Wisconsin court considered this inadequate since there
was "no specified list of activities ... other than those relating to discipline."
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2. It serves as a medium through which the legal profession can
discuss, analyze and form a common judgment upon the important
political, economic, social and international problems of the day.
There is obvious public value of this function in a democracy.
3. Many of the activities of a bar association improve the
technical competence and general welfare of the members of the
bar. It has been said many times that the practice of law involves
the rendition of a public service. s* The competence and fitness of
the practitioner should be equal to the service required of him. The
restriction of the practice of law to lawyers is based on the premise
that practitioners of special qualifications are required. To the
extent that bar associations aim to provide or improve these quali-
ties it is rendering a public service.
4. It fosters the development of a common professional con-
sciousness, an esprit de corps. The importance of this element is
often overlooked. It plays a vital role in the maintenance of a high
level of ethical and professional conduct that cannot be attained by
the cruder devices of investigating committees and disciplinary pro-
ceedings, necessary as the latter may be. The typical bar banquet,
with its food of debatable quality and worse speeches, may, never-
theless, contribute its part to this intangible but important element.
The Wisconsin court appears concerned over the fact that in
some of these functions, particularly with respect to some aspects
of the unauthorized practice of law, members of the bar are often
actuated by motives of private professional gain. But reliance on
individual interest to secure a public purpose is a common device in
our law and society. The public interest still is being served. Nor is it
important that lawyers, in their bar association deliberations do not,
by any means, always arrive at the right answers. What is im-
portant is that they are dealing with problems of public concern
and seeking solutions to them. Money used to support these efforts
is serving a sound public purpose.
The court's third argument, that it must supervise the work
of the organization to assure its restriction to proper purposes seems
equally unsound. The court assumes there is no other method by
which this question can be determined. But other courts have not
found it so. If funds raised by compulsory membership dues are
being used for an improper purpose, the individual members of the
Far themselves may safely be entrusted to raise the question for the
84. For an excellent statement, see Pound, What Is a Profession? The
Rise of the Legal Profession in Antiquity, (1944) 19 Notre Dame Lawyer
203.
1947]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
court's determination. This leaves the organization free from judi-
cial intereference until called upon to pass on a specific question.
It leaves the court free from any identification with the work of the
organization. Such appears to be the position taken by all other
courts which have integrated their bars, although to date no instance
where a question of this kind was raised has been discovered, and
it is in keeping with traditional judicial methods. It does not follow
that, because no state audit of the bar's expenditures has been
provided by statute, the court itself must assume a similar task.
The court is acting sui generis in the exercise of its conceded in-
herent power over the bar and may provide methods and procedures
appropriate to its special province without emulating the practices
of other government departments.
In the opinion of the writer, the Wisconsin court was not influ-
enced so much by the cogency of its reasons as by external factors
not mentioned in the opinion. The 1943 Wisconsin integration act'5
had been the subject of a great deal of controversy as well as of
long and arduous advocacy by the Wisconsin bar. On its passage
it had been vetoed by the late Governor Goodland, an extraordi-
nary character then in his eighties who, by his vigor and the sin-
cerity of his convictions captured the imagination of the Wisconsin
electorate. His objection to integration was that it would encroach
unduly on the freedom of action of the individual lawyer" the argu-
ment, basically, of the court in the case under discussion. The bill
was passed over his veto by a bare margin over the necessary vote
and by a procedure that brought in question the validity of the act.
The governor immediately commenced an action against the secre-
tary of state to enjoin the filing of the statute on the ground that it
had not been properly enacted over his veto. This litigation came
before the Supreme Court in Goodland v. Ziniternwn.57 The
validity of the act was sustained but further action by the court in
integrating the bar was deferred until the return of the lawyers in
the armed services, an argument which the governor also had used
in vetoing the measure.
In the meantime, attempts were made to repeal the act and, on
85. Wis. Stat., 1945, sec. 256.31. The history of the integration move-
ment in Wisconsin is set out in Shea, Wisconsin's Successful Bar Integration
Campaign, (1943) 27 Jr. Am. Jud. Soc. 13.
86. Rept. of Comm. on Integration, (1943) Proc. State Bar Ass'n of
W is. 145, 148. Governor Goodland himself was a lawyer.
87. (1943) 243 Wis. 459, 10 N. W. 2d 180. The injunction was held
improper, but the court of its own motion proceeded to examine the validity
of the act. Its decision as stated in the text appears in Integration of the Bar
Case, (1943) 244 Wis. 8, 11 N. W. 2d 604, 12 N. W. 2d 699.
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several occasions during the 1945 session, the bill to repeal came
exceedingly close to passage. 8s
More serious were the developments in the 1945 spring election.
Justice Barlow of the Supreme Court, whose term was expiring,
was running for re-election. Filing against him was the then secre-
tary of state, Fred R. Zimmerman, who had theretofore been
elected to his office by exceedingly large votes. The alarming fea-
ture of his candidacy was that he was not a member of the bar. This
was not required under the constitution and laws of Wisconsin. A
vigorous campaign by the bar and the press 9 resulted in the re-
election of Justice Barlow. This experience, however, must have
left a profound impression upon all members of the court.
With the known and vigorously asserted opposition of the
governor, whose popularity and vote getting ability confounded the
politicians, with waning legislative enthusiasm for integration and
with a probable political consciousness engendered in the court by
the nightmare of the Zimmerman candidacy, it would require
greater enthusiasm for integration of the bar than had yet been
exhibited by the Wisconsin court before favorable action could be
expected. The views of the octonegarian lawyer in the executive
chair probably fell on receptive ears.90 The combination of these
events led to the decision rendered.
Until the personnel of the Wisconsin court has changed, inte-
gration in that state is probably dead. But the foregoing account
should sufficiently demonstrate that the spectacle in Wisconsin is
hardly an example to be followed in any other state.
88. Pending Legislation, (1945) 18 Bul. State Bar Ass'n Wis. 92, 95.
89. See items from various newspapers set forth in Echoes from the
Press, (1945) 18 Bul. State Bar Ass'n Wis. 53.
90. Justice Fowler, who dissented in Integration of the Bar Case, supra,
footnote 87, on the ground that the court's only concern should be with
professional conduct that affects actions in court, is 85 years of age. ChiefJustice Rosenberry, who wrote the majority opinion' in the same case, is 79.
Justice Fairchild is 75. The remaining justices range in age from 44 to 69.
The information is from biographical and directory sources. The final opinion
rejecting integration in Re Integration of the Bar, (1946) 249 Wis. 523, 25
N. W. 2d 500, was written per curiam.
